
THE 



FRENCH ALLIANCE 



ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE RHODE ISLAND 

STATE SOCIETY OF THE CINCINNATI, AT THE 

STATE HOUSE AT NEWPORT, RHODE 

ISLAND, ON JULY 4, 1904 



BY 



CHARLES ROWLAND RUSSELL 



■%■■■ 



■fc 



THE 

FRENCH ALLIANCE 



ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE RHODE ISLAND 

STATE SOCIETY OF THE CINCINNATI, AT THE 

STATE HOUSE AT NEWPORT, RHODE 

ISLAND, ON JULY 4, 1904 



BY 

CHARLES ROWLAND RUSSELL 



With the compliments of 

Charles Howland Russell 



NEW YORK 
1904 



^- 










Gift 
Author 

(IVsOfl) 

29M'04 



THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 

WHEN we meet each year upon the Fourth of 
July, we should realize that we celebrate not 
only the anniversary of the Declaration of Indepen- 
dence but also the far more important fact of that 
independence itself. Had not that independence 
been achieved, the Declaration long ago would have 
been forgotten, or, at best, be a mere episode of very 
little historical importance. 

In celebrating, therefore, this independence which 
was achieved, our thoughts naturally turn to the 
forces and influences which enabled it to be achieved. 
Among such influences there were several, them- 
selves the result of great underlying causes, ap- 
parent in the long retrospect of the previous 
history of Europe, which played important parts in 
the final series of events which culminated in our 
independence. Not alone, as it now seems, could 
Washington and the other statesmen and patriots 
and the brave and long-suffering armies of the col- 
onies have won the victory. Many circumstances 
combined to aid them; and important among these 
were the relations which existed between France and 
Spain and between each of those powers and Eng- 
land at the time of the American Revolution. As 



has been well said, even the stars in their courses 
seemed to fight for American independence. And 
one of the greatest of the influences which at the 
end enabled that independence to be won was the 
alliance which was made between the thirteen colo- 
nies, or, as they called themselves, the thirteen 
United States, and the King of France in Febi*uary, 
1778. 

At the time of the Declaration of Independence, 
a state of war had already existed for over a year 
between the colonies and the mother country. The 
war had practically killed all commerce. The trade 
of the colonies had been chiefly with England and 
the West Indies, and as a result of the war that 
trade and the coasting trade and the fisheries were 
almost at an end. There was a market for American 
products in France, but the British cruisers con- 
trolled the seas. Almost everything, except food, 
which was needed for the prosecution of the war — 
clothing for the troops, arms and military supplies 
of every kind, as well as adequate financial assist- 
ance—could be procured only from Europe. Early 
in the struggle the American leaders realized that 
it was likely to be long as well as severe; and 
their thoughts turned toward France as a possible 
friend. They knew that she was still smarting under 
the disastrous peace of 1763, at the end of the 
Seven Years' War, which had stripped her of her 
important possessions upon the continent of North 
America and had injured her in other respects; and 
they believed that she might now see her opportunity 
to recover much that she had lost, through the com- 
mercial advantages which they were prepared to 



offer her and through the injury which would re- 
sult to England in the event of American success. 

Early in 1776 Silas Deane was sent to France, 
as agent of the States, to seek assistance. Later 
Frankhn and Lee joined him there, the three hav- 
ing been appointed envoys to the French court; and 
all eyes in America were turned longingly to 
France, with the hope that the aid which was ab- 
solutely necessary for the continuance of the strug- 
gle would come from her. 

Let us consider what this France was to which 
America looked for help. It was still France of the 
old regime. The power of the king was practi- 
cally absolute. The old feudal nobility had become 
hangers-on at court, seekers after honors and favors. 
In theory the king was still the State, as had been 
Louis XIV, but the influences about the throne 
were too aggressive and too strong to be overcome 
by any other than a wise and determined king, and 
such Louis XVI was not. There was no such thing 
in France as what to-day we call public opinion ; but 
there existed a force, which we now know was 
stronger than any one then imagined it to be, and 
which was leading France to revolution. This was 
the day of the salons and of the " philosophers " and 
the " encyclopaedists." There were some serious 
philosophers among them, who saw that changes 
were needed in the organization of society and gov- 
ernment; and we have learned from experience that 
the doctrines of the philosophers and dreamers of 
one generation often become the rallying-cries of 
political parties in another. 

The Frenchmen and Frenchwomen of the day, of 



6 

rank or intellect or ability, were many of them un- 
willing to be simply idle people of pleasure ; and they 
gathered in the salons and gossiped philosophy. 
Clever sayings and verses, essays and disquisitions, 
were the order of the day. The France of that time 
has been called " a despotism tempered by epigrams." 
About the edges of the salons hung ambitious law- 
yers and others, who, if they were interesting or en- 
tertaining, gained an entrance and a hearing. The 
writers of pamphlets were in vogue and made much 
of. At that time, particularly, there was a great 
deal of talk and writing about the regeneration of the 
world and about ideal states of society and a millen- 
nium to come. The most popular subjects of the day 
were liberty and the rights of man. Little did all 
these people realize that the irresponsible talk, the 
pamphlets, the essays and the disquisitions were lay- 
ing the train of the explosion which was to come. 

Even at the court it was the fashion to talk of 
liberty and the rights of man; and, when the thir- 
teen colonies went to war and sought to separate 
from England, it seemed to the philosophers and the 
salons that the new era at last had begun; that 
across the Atlantic the ideal democratic state was 
born ; that there was a race with the antique virtues, 
determined to be free ; that there was liberty fighting 
for its existence. The sympathy with liberty and 
the rights of man now had something definite and 
concrete to which to attach itself; and so the philos- 
ophers and the salons, and with them the general 
world of Paris, believing that success by the Ameri- 
cans would of necessity hurt England, took up the 
American cause, and the cry was that France must 
help the struggling patriots. 



The young nobles and the soldiers of fortune, of 
whom there were many in France, were anxious to 
serve in America ; and Deane was quite overwhelmed 
with requests for commissions, and gave so many 
that for a time there was danger that the American 
army would be swamped with these volunteers, and 
Washington found some of those who came more 
of an annoyance than a benefit. But great names 
in the war stand out from among them— Lafayette, 
De Kalb, Pulaski, and Steuben. 

Franklin already was well known in Europe 
among men of learning, and, now an old man, was 
hailed as a philosopher and a sage. His arrival in 
France was welcomed as that of " the great m,an 
who had snatched the lightning from the gods of 
Olympus and torn the sceptre from the hands of 
tyrants, the gods of the earth." That such lan- 
guage was permitted and went unrestrained shows 
that great changes had come since the days of the 
Grand Monarque. " Sire," said the Marshal de 
Richeheu, who had seen three reigns, addressing 
Louis XVI, " under Louis XIV no one dared utter 
a word; under Louis XV people whispered; under 
your Majesty they talk aloud." ^ 

The prime minister, Maurepas, was opposed to 
helping the American cause, and so was the great 
finance minister, Turgot, who realized that the giv- 
ing of aid to the Americans would lead France into 
war with England. The state of the finances did 
not justify it; even should France be successful the 
expenses of such a war would be enormous; and 
there was no existing cause of offence or dispute 
with England. Events proved that his advice was 

^Taine: Ancien Regime. 



8 

sound. The king's own judgment and scruples were 
opposed to it, and it is believed that his brother-in- 
law, the emperor Joseph II, advised him against it. 
Probably the greatest influence of all upon the side 
of the Americans was the arguments of the adven- 
turer Beaumarchais, who convinced first Vergennes, 
the able minister for foreign affairs, and afterward 
the king that by aiding the Americans England 
would be injured and France benefited. 

The queen took up the American cause. La- 
fayette, many years afterward, said that she really 
did not sympathize with it, but that, like a true 
woman of the world, she followed the fashion of the 
day. Thomas Paine, in his " Rights of Man," more 
gallantly saj^s: "It is both justice and gratitude 
to say that it was the Queen of France who gave 
the cause of America a fashion at the French 
Court." 

And so— no doubt somewhat to the surprise and 
bewilderment, though to the satisfaction, of our en- 
voys — the cause of America became the fashion. 
Turgot had retired from the ministry; and the in- 
fluence of Vergennes in foreign afl'airs was para- 
mount. The arguments of Beaumarchais, convincing 
first Vergennes and then overcoming the sciniples 
of the king; the opportunity to injure England and 
thus, as was believed, to restore the power of France ; 
the fad of the day, of liberty and the rights of man, 
prevailing in the salons and among the philosophers 
and ready writers ; the desire of the young nobles and 
the soldiers of fortune to seek adventure and win 
glory by their swords in the cause of the young 
republic against the old enemy — all these together 



9 

finally brought the king to consent to the giving of 
aid to the colonies. 

But such aid could be given only in an under- 
hand vi^ay. The government could not appear and 
thereby be compromised. But Vergennes and the 
clever Beaumarchais got up a commercial house, and 
the government sold to this house at low prices and 
on long credit its ovt^n arms and munitions of war 
and other supplies. This house shipped the goods 
to America ; and Congress sent to it in return cargoes 
of rice, fish, indigo, and tobacco, many of which, be- 
ing captured, never arrived. One million of francs 
were secretly paid by Vergennes to Beaumarchais 
in 1776 for the assistance of the colonies, and later 
in the same year an additional one million of francs 
were sent by Spain to Vergennes, through the lat- 
ter's influence, for the same purpose. In 1777 Beau- 
marchais received a second million of francs from 
the French government; and money of his own and 
of other individuals also was put into these ven- 
tures. During the years 1776 and 1777 vessels 
loaded with clothing for the troops, powder, muskets, 
cannon, and other necessary supplies thus were sent 
to America. Most of them, with their precious car- 
goes, arrived in safety ; and but for their arrival mili- 
tary operations, except upon a very small scale, 
could not have been continued by the Americans. 
The military supplies received from France made 
possible the defeat of Burgoyne, of which we shall 
hear later. American privateers had a refuge in 
French harbors. The king, as a free gift, sent an- 
other million of francs to Deane, with no doubt be- 
tween them as to where the money was to go. 



10 

On the 28tli of December, 1776, the three Ameri- 
can envoys were informally received by Vergennes. 
They had been instructed to endeavor to procure a 
treaty of alliance with France ; but the French gov- 
ernment was not yet ready for war and could not 
make any promises, but nevertheless it was willing 
secretly to help them, and they were given two mil- 
lions of francs more, but were told not to say from 
where they came. The king's free gifts, before the 
treaty of alliance was made in 1778, thus amounted 
to three millions of francs. Help was continuously 
being given in the ways already mentioned, and was 
of the greatest possible benefit ; but some of the ships 
with supplies were captured, as were also some of the 
ships which were bringing cargoes sent by Congress 
to pay its debts in France. It was realized in America 
that so long as England had control of the sea she 
had an enormous advantage, and for this reason, 
among others, the envoys were instructed to ask the 
French government to make a treaty of alliance and 
to aid the Americans with troops and ships of war. 
The envoys were listened to with kindness and cour- 
tesy ; but as yet there were no signs of any readiness 
upon the part of France to make such a treaty as they 
desired. France was watching the progress of events 
in England and in America and biding her time; 
and she and Spain were preparing for war. 

So things drifted along. At the end of the au- 
tumn of 1777, it was the general opinion in Europe 
that the war was practically at an end and that the 
American cause was lost. To the discouraged 
Americans even the great victory which had been 
won over Burgoyne at Saratoga in October seemed, 



11 

at the end of the year, to have had no permanent 
results of value. But it did have great results, of 
which they were soon to learn, in its effect upon 
opinion in Europe. 

It is true that the British forces in America had 
effected very little, but they were there, with all 
Great Britain and its power back of them. It was 
known in Europe that the British government in- 
tended to send out large additional military forces. 
The war seemed to be at a standstill. There were 
quarrels and dissensions among the Americans. 
Congress had little authority or power, and no one 
was disposed to lend it money. The troops at Valley 
Forge were almost in a state of famine. At one time 
half of them were unfit for duty through lack of 
clothing; and, when they marched, their way was 
marked upon the snow by the blood from their naked 
feet. It was believed in America that no further help 
could be had from France. Holland was rendering 
some aid through her merchants, but she did not wish 
to break with England; and the efforts of the 
American agents sent to procure assistance from 
other powers had been unsuccessful. There were 
great difficulties and long delays in communication; 
and often for many months no letters were received 
by Congress from its agents. The British cruisers 
swarmed about the coasts of Europe and America; 
and there was no more privateering by American 
ships from France, for the British squadrons ef- 
fectively watched the French ports and prevented 
their going out. 

Toward the end of the year, the envoys asked the 
French government to help them by buying a frig- 



12 

ate which was being built for them in Holland, but 
which probably could not safeh^ leave there when 
finished, and by a loan of money. The king agreed 
to buy the frigate and to lend them three millions 
of francs, and also promised always to provide them 
with funds to pay the interest on their debt. 

The news of the defeat of Burgoyne at Saratoga 
was not received in France until early in the month 
of December, 1777. The intelhgence of that vic- 
tory, and of the surrender of a British army under 
an able commander, was the turning-point in Euro- 
pean opinion. It came like a thunder-bolt upon the 
government of England; and it convinced the gov- 
ernment of France that the time had now arrived 
openly to aid the American cause. A few days after 
the news was received, Vergennes informed the 
American envoys that they might now renew their 
proposition for an alliance ; and on the sixth of Feb- 
ruary, 1778, there were signed at Paris two treaties, 
one of amity and commerce and the other of alliance. 

We do not need the records of history to enable us 
to understand with what rejoicing the news of these 
treaties was received in America. The future which 
had seemed so dark now seemed bright and full of 
encouragement. There is no episode in the whole 
progress of the war more touching than that of the 
ragged troops at Valley Forge, paraded to receive 
the announcement of the conclusion of the treaties, 
shouting with joy and gratitude: "Long live the 
King of France ! " Washington, in his general order 
to the troops, said that it had " pleased the Al- 
mighty Ruler of the universe propitiously to defend 
the cause of the United American States, and by 



13 

finally raising up a powerful friend among the 
nations of the earth to establish our Liberty and In- 
dependence upon a lasting foundation." 

Let us consider what all this meant. It was more 
than the assurance of military and naval assistance. 
These treaties were a recognition by a great sov- 
ereign power of the actual existence of the United 
States as an independent sovereignty. The Declara- 
tion of Independence had recited that the united 
colonies " are absolved from all allegiance to the 
British crown . . . and that as free and indepen- 
dent states they have full power to levy war, conclude 
peace, contract alliances . . . and do all other acts 
and things which independent states may of right 
do." But the declaration of their independence did 
not make the colonies independent; their indepen- 
dence was merely asserted, not established, and had 
never been recognized by any power outside of the 
colonies. All Europe, whether friendly or other- 
wise, had regarded the colonists simply as insurgents. 
It must be remembered also that there were grave 
doubts among many of the Americans themselves 
as to whether the declaration was wise or justified. 
Some of the most patriotic men in the colonies, some 
of the most sincere believers in independence, op- 
posed the declaration upon the ground of its being 
premature, and contended that, as a result of the 
declaration, the war, instead of being one to obtain 
redress or of mere resistance to oppression and in- 
justice, was open rebellion. But now how changed 
the situation! Think of the effect upon American 
hearts of these words from the treaty of amity and 
commerce made between the thirteen struggling col- 



^ 



14 

onies, which called themselves States, and the great 
King of France: " There shall be a firai, inviolable 
and universal peace and a true and sincere friend- 
ship between the Most Christian King, his heirs and 
successors, and the United States of America " ; and 
of these words from the treaty of alliance: " If war 
should break out between France and Great Britain 
during the continuance of the present war between 
the United States and England, His Majesty and 
the said United States shall make it a common cause 
and aid each other mutually with their good offices, 
their counsels, and their forces, according to the 
exigence of conjunctures, as becomes good and faith- 
ful allies. . . . The essential and direct end of the 
present defensive alliance is to maintain effectual 
the liberty, sovereignty and independence absolute 
and unlimited of the said United States, as well in 
matters of government as of commerce. . . . Nei- 
ther of the two parties shall conclude either truce 
or peace with Great Britain without the formal con- 
sent of the other first obtained; and they mutually 
engage not to lay down their arms until the inde- 
pendence of the United States shall have been for- 
mally or tacitly assured by the treaty or treaties that 
shall terminate the war." 

The treaty was not formally announced, nor were 
the American envoys presented to the king, until 
March. The British ambassador thereupon left 
Paris. In the preceding month, after the treaties 
had been concluded, but before they were publicly 
known, although rumors of them had reached the 
members of the opposition, Lord North introduced 
in the House of Commons his proposals for concil- 



15 

iation with America, which were adopted; but upon 
their receipt in America they were rejected by Con- 
gress, which repUed that it would now consider no- 
thing short of the independence of the colonies. Un- 
doubtedly these terms of conciliation would have 
been accepted gladly if they had been presented 
three, or perhaps even two, years earlier. But now 
it was too late. 

One of the best of American historians has said: 
" The French alliance determined the complete sep- 
aration of America from England." ^ 

The government of France now was the open ally 
of the colonies, and soon afterward war broke out 
between France and England. Paul Jones entered 
the harbor of Brest on the thirteenth of February, 

1778, in the American man-of-war Ranger, carrying 
the flag of the United States, which was then, for the 
first time in its history, saluted by the guns of a 
foreign power. The ports of France were open to 
American ships of war, and from them went out the 
cruisers upon their work of harrying the British 
coasts and destroying and capturing British mer- 
chantmen. From a French port sailed, in August, 

1779, the Bonhomme Richard, upon the "immortal 
cruise " which ended with the great night battle with 
the SerapiSj of which one can never read without 
a thrill. The utmost consternation prevailed all 
along the British coasts ; and the battle was the talk 
of Europe. 

In July, 1778, a strong French fleet under Count 
d'Estaing, bringing the first French minister to this 
country and four thousand troops, arrived in Amer- 

1 William M. Sloane. 



16 

ica. Plans were made for a combined attack of the 
French and American forces upon Newport, where 
there was then a large British force. The fleet pro- 
ceeded to Narragansett Bay and awaited the arrival 
of General Sullivan and his army; but there was 
long delay in the gathering of the militia and conti- 
nental troops; and, before they were ready to unite 
with the French in the proposed attack, a British 
fleet, which had come to the assistance of the forces 
upon the island, appeared outside of Newport. The 
French fleet with the troops still on board went out 
to engage it, but a violent storm arose by which both 
fleets were much injured, and the French fleet was 
so disabled that the admiral proceeded to Boston 
to refit. 

It is not necessary to tell this audience the story 
of the battle of Rhode Island, which Lafayette 
called " the best-fought action of the war," and that 
it resulted in the retreat of General Sullivan and 
the American forces. The French fleet and troops, 
after passing several months in Boston, sailed to the 
West Indies, which seemed to the French, and un- 
doubtedly then were, the most important field of war 
as between them and the English. 

In September, 1779, d'Estaing, with his fleet and 
several thousand troops, returned from the West In- 
dies and united with the American forces under Gen- 
eral Lincoln in the siege of Savannah. In a gallant 
assault upon the British works the allied forces were 
defeated, although both the French and American 
flags were for a moment planted upon the enemy's 
ramparts. D'Estaing in person led the French 
troops, and was wounded; and the French loss in 
killed and wounded was about seven hundred. 



17 

In the same year Spain made common cause with 
France against England. She never entered into 
any alliance with the thirteen colonies, and did not 
recognize their independence. Her unwillingness 
to do so and her lack of sympathy with them can 
well be understood in view of her interests as a 
great American colonial power; but from the begin- 
ning, by reason of her sentiments of hostility to 
England, she was determined to prevent, if possi- 
ble, the return of the colonies to their previous alle- 
giance. She undertook to play the part of a medi- 
ator between France and England ; but insisted upon 
the independence of the colonies as a condition of 
any arrangement which should be made between 
those countries. This the British would not hear 
of; and Spain then determined upon war. She was 
anxious to recover Gibraltar, Minorca, Jamaica, and 
Florida; and the two navies joined would, it was be- 
lieved, constitute a force far stronger than that of 
England, and be able to control the seas both in Eu- 
rope and in America. England now had France 
and Spain as well as the thirteen colonies at war 
against her ; and the theatre of war was extended far 
beyond the colonies, with the consequent inability 
of England to employ the greater part of her forces 
in the war upon this continent. 

The scene of the conflict in America shifted to the 
Southern States, and there the general course of the 
war was unfavorable to the American arms. Geor- 
gia and South Carolina and part of North Carolina 
were lost. The British plan of campaign there was 
to harass and tire out the Americans, and to cut off 
the Southern States from the others. The year 1780 
was indeed a year of disasters, and it seemed to many 



18 

of the patriot Americans that the end of the long 
struggle was near — an end involving defeat and fail- 
ure. Congress was weak and vacillating, and had 
little authority. It had no power to levy taxes, nor to 
compel the separate States to levy the taxes which 
it recommended to them for the necessary mainte- 
nance of the army in the field; the system of short 
enlistments and a strange jealousy of the army in- 
terfered greatly with its numbers and efficiency; the 
troops were discontented, and in some instances there 
had been open mutiny. The state of the finances 
was as bad as bad could be, and Congress and the 
coimtry were suffering from large issues of paper 
currency, which had greatly depreciated in value. 
There seems to be no doubt that, unfortunately, there 
was a somewhat general belief among the Americans 
that France and Spain sooner or later would make 
terms with England which would be advantageous 
to America, and, therefore, that to a great degree 
the future might be trusted to them rather than to 
self-reliance and earnest effort. Political wire-pull- 
ing, speculation, and selfish interests were rampant; 
and a large part of the people were apathetic. More 
important than all these, there was no central au- 
thority. The bond between the States was a very 
loose one; and, as a result, during the entire period 
of the war there was a lack of unity of action and of 
definite and sustained purpose, which became more 
and more felt as the war progressed, and which, in 
this most anxious and critical period, seems to have 
caused almost a paralysis of all governmental power 
and effort. A direct effect, however, of the impotence 
of Congress was the strengthening of the influence 



19 

and authority of Washington. Every patriotic heart 
tui-ned to him. His wisdom, judgment, and courage 
met every difficulty; and the love of the army and 
its trust in him never failed. But these were, indeed, 
" the times which tried men's souls." 

Should there be doubt in any one's mind as to the 
critical condition of the American cause, let us turn 
to the language of Washington. If we find him 
using words which describe the situation as serious, 
we may well believe that it was serious indeed. 

In a letter written to President Reed of Pennsyl- 
vania in May, 1780, in reference particularly to the 
neglect of Congress to make proper provision for 
the army, he said: " I assure you every idea you can 
form of our distresses will fall short of the reality. 
There is such a combination of circumstances to ex- 
haust the patience of the soldiery that it begins at 
length to be worn out, and we see in every line of 
the army the most serious features of mutiny and 
sedition. All our departments, all our operations 
are at a stand; and unless a system very different 
from that which has for a long time prevailed be 
immediately adopted throughout the States, our 
affairs must soon become desperate beyond the pos- 
sibility of recovery. . . . Indeed, I have almost 
ceased to hope. The country in general is in such a 
state of insensibility and indifference to its interests 
that I dare not flatter myself with any change for the 
better. . . . This is a decisive moment; one of the 
most. I will go further and say the most important 
America has seen. The Court of France has made 
a glorious effort for our deliverance, and if we dis- 
appoint its intentions by our supineness we must be- 



20 

come contemptible in the eyes of all mankind; nor 
can we after that venture to confide that our allies 
will persist in an attempt to establish what it will 
appear we want inclination or ability to assist them 
in." In August, 1780, in a conmiunication to Con- 
gress, he said: " To me it will appear miraculous if 
our affairs can maintain themselves much longer in 
their present train. If either the temper or the re- 
sources of the country will not admit of an alteration, 
we may expect soon to be reduced to the humiliating 
condition of seeing the cause of America upheld by 
foreign arms. The generosity of our allies has a 
claim to our confidence and our gratitude, but it is 
neither for the honor of America nor for the interest 
of the common cause to leave the work entirely to 
them." Later in the same year he wrote to Luzerne, 
the French minister in America: "I need use no 
arguments to convince your Excellency of the ex- 
tremity to which our affairs are tending, and the 
necessity of support. You are an eye-witness to all 
our perplexities and all our wants. You know the 
dangerous consequences of leaving the enemy in 
quiet possession of their southern conquests, either in 
regard to negotiation this winter or a continuance 
of the war. You know our inability to expel them 
unassisted, or perhaps even to stop their career." 

Upon the personal efforts of Washington in 
America and of Franklin in France everything 
seems at this period to have depended. 

Franklin was then alone at Paris. Congress was 
always drawing bills on him, apparently without 
considering whether he had the means to meet them, 
and the ships with American cargoes were slow in 



21 

coming or never came. The French government, 
however, responded most generously. Mr. Parton, 
in his "Life of FrankHn," says: "Never did he 
apply in vain. Never was he obliged to defer the 
payment of a draft for an hour." In fact, the very 
liberality and kindness of France undoubtedly made 
Congress the less active in endeavoring to raise 
money. 

He had been instructed to ask for a further loan of 
twenty-five millions of francs for necessary supplies ; 
and he laid the matter before Vergennes. In addi- 
tion to the gifts of the king, already mentioned, and 
supplies and services furnished, France had made 
loans to the Americans of three millions of francs in 
1778, of one million in 1779, and of four millions in 
1780, which were of inestimable advantage. Be- 
sides the fact that the credit of Congress was so low 
that it was practically impossible for the American 
representatives to borrow money in Europe, they 
were also embarrassed by the presence of agents of 
some of the States, who were trying to secure sep- 
arate loans; and at that time, as war upon the con- 
tinent of Europe was expected, most of the govern- 
ments were preparing for it, and their applications 
for loans were much more attractive to money-lend- 
ers than those of the Americans. How seriously 
Franklin regarded the situation can best be under- 
stood by his own words in a communication to Ver- 
gennes making the request for the loan, in February, 
1781 : " I am grown old. I feel myself much enfee- 
bled by my late long illness, and it is probable I shall 
not long have anj^ more concern in these affairs. I 
therefore take this occasion to express my opinion to 



22 

your Excellency that the present conjuncture is criti- 
cal ; that there is some danger lest the Congress should 
lose its influence over the people, if it is found unable 
to procure the aids that are wanted, and that the 
whole system of the new government in America may 
thereby be shaken ; that, if the English are suffered 
once to recover that country, such an opportunity of 
efl'ectual separation as the present may not occur 
again in the course of ages." 

Early in 1781 Laurens, who was one of Washing- 
ton's aides, was sent to France to describe the Amer- 
ican necessities to the French government, and to 
ask for help. In a letter dated January fifteenth, and 
taken by Laurens to Franklin, Washington said: 
" To me nothing appears more evident than that the 
period of our opposition will veiy shortly arrive, if 
our allies cannot afford us that effectual aid, par- 
ticularly in money and in a naval superiority, which 
are now solicited." And in another letter to Frank- 
lin he said: "We must have one of two things — 
peace, or money from France." 

In April, 1781, Washington wrote to Laurens, 
then in Europe, as follows : " Day does not follow 
night more certainly than it brings with it some addi- 
tional proof of the impracticability of carrying on 
the war without the aids you were directed to so- 
licit. As an honest and candid man, whose all de- 
pends on the final and happy termination of the 
present contest, I assert this, while I give it deci- 
sively as my opinion that without a foreign loan, our 
present force, which is but the remnant of an army, 
cannot be kept together this campaign, much less 
will it be increased and in readiness for another. 



LafG. 



23 

The observations contained in my letter of the 
fifteenth of January last are verified every moment ; 
and if France delays a timely and powerful aid in 
the critical posture of our affairs, it will avail us 
nothing should she attempt it hereafter. We are 
at this hour suspended in the balance, not from 
choice, but from hard and absolute necessity. . . . 
But why need I run into detail, when it may be de- 
clared in a word that we are at the end of our tether, 
and that now or never our deliverance must come." 
Vergennes replied to Franklin that the great ex- 
penses which France was incurring in the war pre- 
vented her making the loan asked for, but that the 
king himself would give six millions of francs as a 
free gift, in addition to the three millions which he 
had given before. This was a great and most wel- 
come help. In all the dealings between the French 
government and the American envoys, during the 
war, the conduct of the king and ministry at 
every point was marked by the utmost candor, 
frankness, courtesy, and kindness. And it may 
properly be mentioned here that, notwithstanding 
the reduced condition of the French treasury and 
the great demands upon it, a further loan of four 
millions of francs was made to the Americans in 
1781, and in the same year they were enabled to 
procure a loan equivalent to ten millions of francs 
from Holland, upon the guaranty of its payment 
by the King of France. In 1782, France loaned 
them six millions more, and again in 1783 six millions. 
The sums received from the government of France, 
by the gifts of the king and by loans, and by means 
of the loan procured from Holland upon the king's 



24 

guaranty, aggregated about forty-four millions of 
francs. And the purchasing power of the franc was 
far greater then than it is now. Without the finan- 
cial aid thus received, the struggle for indepen- 
dence could not have been continued. In ad- 
dition, undoubtedly further assistance in money 
and supplies was given, the exact amount of which it 
is difficult to ascertain. Mr. Pickering, secretary 
of state, in a despatch to the American minister at 
Paris in 1797, stated that " all the loans and sup- 
plies received from France in the American war, 
amounting nearly to 53,000,000 livres " (or francs) 
had been paid in 1795; and we know that at that 
time the account with Beaumarchais had not yet 
been adjusted or settled. 

Lafayette, who had returned to France in 1779, 
joined with Franklin in urging further aid, and, 
upon his return to America in April, 1780, brought 
the welcome news that French fleets with twelve 
thousand troops soon would depart for America. 
Lafayette was received with great favor upon this 
visit to France. Maurepas said of him: " It is for- 
tunate for the King that Lafayette does not take 
it into his head to strip Versailles of its furniture, 
to send to his dear Americans, as his Majesty would 
be unable to refuse it." 

On the tenth of July, 1780, a French fleet under 
Admiral de Ternay arrived at Newport, which had 
been evacuated by the British in 1779, bringing the 
first division of six thousand men, under command 
of Count de Rochambeau, and with the news that 
the second division soon would follow. The second 
division, however, when ready to sail, was blockaded 



25 

by the British at Brest, and never reached America. 
The officers and troops under Rochambeau had been 
most carefully chosen and were of the highest qual- 
ity in eveiy respect; and the instructions from the 
king to Rochambeau placed him under the orders 
of Washington. 

The French forces, upon their arrival at New- 
port, went into camp there and in the neighborhood, 
and later into winter quarters at Newport and at 
Providence, excepting the cavalry and artillery, 
which were sent to Connecticut. The history of the 
visit of the French to Newport is a very interesting 
one, and doubtless is well known to many of you. 
They won the confidence and respect of every one in 
Rhode Island. Probably never in the history of an 
army was there a greater, if so great, an instance 
of excellent behavior in every respect. The French 
troops showed every possible consideration to the 
people among whom they were quartered, and made 
themselves liked and welcome wherever they went. 
They paid promptly for what they needed; and we 
may be sure that the farmers and tradesmen of 
Rhode Island were glad to see the good, hard 
money with which they paid, in those days of the de- 
preciated State and Continental paper. It is said 
that no property, even of the most trivial kind, was 
ever taken by the French soldiers in Rhode Island. 
Lafayette, who was an officer of the American army 
and commanded American troops, wrote from New- 
port to General Washington, in July, 1780: " You 
would have been amused the other day to see two 
hundred and fifty of our recruits who came to Co- 
nanicut without provisions and without tents, and 



26 

who mingled so well with the French troops that 
every Frenchman, officer or soldier, took an Ameri- 
can with him and shared with him, in a most friendly 
way, his bed and supper. . . . The French disci- 
pline is such that chickens and pigs walk among the 
tents without any one disturbing them, and there 
is a field of com in the camp, not an ear of which 
has been touched." One writer says: " The army 
of Rochambeau in its march from Newport to York- 
town was so thoroughly well conducted that there 
was not even a single instance of one of the soldiers 
taking an apple or a peach from an orchard without 
leave having been previously obtained " ; and, when 
they were on the same march, a Hartford newspaper 
stated in reference to them: "A finer body of men 
was never in arms, and no army was ever better fur- 
nished with everytliing necessary for a campaign. 
The exact discipline of the troops and the attention 
of the officers to prevent any injury to individuals 
have made the march of this army through the coim- 
try very agreeable to the inhabitants; and it is with 
great pleasure we assure our readers not a single 
disagreeable circumstance had taken place." 

It is pleasant to read of the good opinion which 
the French won from every one who was brought in 
contact with them during their stay in America ; and 
perhaps no incident is more picturesque than that 
of the visit of a deputation of Quakers to Rocham- 
beau in Philadelphia, when he was passing through 
that city on the way to Yorktown. We can picture 
to our minds the plainly dressed Quakers, with their 
broad-brimmed hats, in the presence of the distin- 
guished French commander and his brilliant officers. 



27 

The eldest one addressed him thus: "General, it 
is not for thy military qualities that we come to 
make thee this visit. We make no account of talents 
for war; but thou art the friend of man, and thy 
army lives in perfect order and discipline. It is 
this that leads us to pay thee our respects." 

The French officers were noble and very gallant 
gentlemen. They knew no fear, and they were 
courteous, kind, and considerate; and some of them 
have left us memoirs of their service in America 
which are interesting reading. Many of you who 
are of Newport probably have read them, and will 
recall the descriptions of the people and of the man- 
ners and customs of Newport and Providence in 
1780 and 1781, and of the hospitalities received and 
returned. And perhaps you remember the pleasant 
things which they tell of your townswomen of that 
day, the pretty Misses Hunter, Margaret Champlin, 
Polly Lawton, and others. The Count de Segur 
wrote: " Certain it is that, if I had not been married 
and happy, I should, whilst coming to defend the 
liberty of the Americans, have lost my own at the 
feet of Polly Lawton." 

When Washington came here in 1781 he passed 
between double lines of the French soldiers, in their 
white uniforms, saluting him on his way from the 
Long Wharf, where he landed, to tliis State House, 
where we now are ; and later he reviewed the French 
troops, whose line extended from Pelham street to 
the two-mile corner. Those were happy days to the 
good people of Newport, and they were especially 
bright after the gloom and sadness of the long years 
of the British occupation which preceded them. 



28 

Early in 1781 two expeditions of portions of the 
French fleet were undertaken from Newport against 
the British in Virginia, but no results of importance 
came from them ; and the fleet, after each of these ex- 
peditions, returned to Newport. 

We are now approaching the end. It is not ne- 
cessary here to go into the particulars of the cam- 
paign which resulted in the defeat and surrender of 
Lord Cornwallis. The French troops from Rhode 
Island and Connecticut joined Wasliington on the 
Hudson, and by strategy of the highest order on his 
part, which won the admiration of the greatest sol- 
diers of Eiu'ope, the combined forces were brought 
together at Yorktown. There the sea was com- 
manded by the fleet of the Count de Grasse, who also 
had landed three thousand French troops; and the 
great opportunity had at last arrived. There, in 
the culminating action of the campaign, the French 
and American allies, one bearing the white flag with 
the golden lilies of France and the other the new 
flag of the thirteen States, soon to be independent 
in fact as well as in name, fought side by side and 
together won the great victory which practically 
closed the war. Without the aid of the French 
troops and the cooperation of the French fleet the 
plan of this campaign would have been impossible 
and this great victory could not have been won. 
When the news of it reached Lord North he ex- 
claimed: " It is all over." 

What would have been the fate of the indepen- 
dence declared at Philadelphia on the Fourth of July, 
1776, if France had not participated in the war, may 
be a subject for speculation; but that that indepen- 



29 

dence was achieved with the aid of France, and 
could not have been won without it when it was won, 
there can be no doubt. There is every reason to 
beheve that, had it not been for the aid of France, 
the Americans would have been forced to abandon 
the struggle. It must be remembered further that 
the value and importance of the aid rendered by 
France is to be measured not only by its direct but 
also by its indirect effects. An immediate and con- 
stant result of the existence of war with France was 
that England found that the greater part of her 
military and naval power must be reserved to meet 
that brave and determined enemy. In a short time 
Spain joined France; and England then found her- 
self engaged not only with the colonists in America, 
but with these other enemies in America, and also in 
the West Indies, in Florida, in the British Channel, 
in the Mediteri'anean, on the coast of Africa, and 
in India. Her forces therefore were divided, and 
she was called upon to defend possessions of the 
greatest value, and even to prepare to defend Eng- 
land itself. As time passed, she declared war against 
Holland, chiefly because the Dutch had allowed 
American privateers to take refuge in their harbors, 
and because documents captured at sea showed that 
the sentiments of Holland were friendly to the colo- 
nists, and that negotiations were in progress for a 
treaty of conmierce. As a result of her constant 
stopping of neutral ships, the maritime powers of 
continental Europe, under the lead of the Empress 
Catharine, adopted the principle that neutral ships 
have the right to cany their cargoes into the ports of 
a country engaged in war, except when such cargoes 



30 

consist of munitions of war, and that paper block- 
ades should be disregarded. In the association of 
Russia, Denmark, and Sweden in the league of the 
"Armed Neutrahty," which was directed particu- 
larly against England, and to which Holland, Prus- 
sia, the German Empire, and Portugal soon after- 
ward became parties, England found most of the 
powers of Europe with whom she was not already en- 
gaged in hostilities very ill-disposed toward her. The 
expenses of this widely extended struggle tried 
heavily even her resources, and the wars in which she 
was engaged became a strain and a burden upon her. 
Necessarily her attention was to a great degree di- 
verted from America, and her capacity actively to 
prosecute the war there was correspondingly re- 
duced. The battle for American independence was 
indirectly being fought on many seas and in many 
lands, where the English met their European ene- 
mies. To the Americans of that day, impatient and 
discouraged, and from time to time disappointed at 
not receiving from France the military and naval 
aid upon their own continent and upon their own 
coasts which they desired, these important facts were 
not so clear as they now are to us. But their im- 
portance to the cause of American independence can- 
not be overestimated; and they all resulted from the 
alliance against England made by the French king 
with the American States. 

Even in monarchical countries outside of France 
—where there was no such sympathy with the Ameri- 
can cause as existed in that country— the progress of 
events caused sympathy to be alienated from Eng- 
land and to turn toward the colonists. And the long 



31 

war, with its expenses and burdens and resultant dis- 
content, not only weakened the determination of the 
British government to overcome the Americans, but 
gave strength to the party in opposition, which was 
in favor of a discontinuance of the war. 

The furnishing of supphes and money— the sin- 
ews of war— has already been mentioned. Let it 
suffice to add that such supplies and money were 
absolutely essential to the prosecution of the war; 
that without them it could not have been continued ; 
and that by the aid of the French government they 
were procured in France, and to a considerable ex- 
tent were generously given as free gifts. 

A great people are greatest in their attitude of 
mind; and the people of these United States, pros- 
perous, strong, and happy in the independence which, 
under the blessing of God, they have so long en- 
joyed, should gladly and ungrudgingly recognize all 
the influences which contributed to the achievement 
of that independence. No one of us, or of those who 
come after us, ever should fail to hold in remembrance 
and in high appreciation the benefits which came 
to our forefathers, and through them have come to 
us, from the French Alliance and from the aid given 
by France in the establishment of our national exis- 
tence. We know that the controlling motives which 
led to the giving of that aid were enmity to England, 
and the belief that the power of that country would 
be humbled and France benefited. Our forefathers 
understood those motives and appealed directly to 
them. The participation of France in our strug- 
gle was based by the government of that countiy 
upon grounds of national policy, having in view 



NOV 16 1904 



32 



primarily and properly the interests of France. 
Our forefathers realized that upon the aid of France 
depended their success in the war for independence. 
They asked — even importuned — France to help 
them ; and she responded generously and effectively. 
Can the people of these United States ever be less 
earnest than was the noble Washington to recognize, 
as he did, that " the generous proofs which His Most 
Christian Majesty has given of his attachment to 
the cause of America . . . must . . . inspire every 
citizen of the States with sentiments of the most un- 
alterable gratitude " ? 

Let us recall what the aid which he gave to the 
" cause of America " cost the king who gave it. 
Among the final causes which wrought his doom 
were the burden of the expenses of the war with 
England, coming upon an already impoverished 
treasury, and the influence upon France of the suc- 
cess of the American Revolution. We should never 
forget that to that unhappy king, Louis XVI, we 
owe the aid which was given us by France in the 
achievement of our independence. 







011 800 137 



